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PROVIDER ISSUES RELATED TO PATIENT CONTROLLED ANALGESIA 
AND NURSE CONTROLLED ANALGESIA ERRORS IN A PEDIATRIC 
HOSPITAL 
TRAVIS J. STROPP 
 
ABSTRACT 
Background 
Medical errors are a danger to patient safety and a significant cause of morbidity 
and mortality.  Additionally, they increase expenditures in an already significantly 
indebted U.S. health care system.  Much confusion exists about definitions of medical 
errors, which include medication errors and adverse drug events (ADEs).  Several federal 
and international organizations have attempted to standardize definitions in order to 
streamline data collection, but until these standards are universally adopted, error reports 
and trends are still subject to questions of validity.  Reporting errors, in general, has 
become a more socially acceptable practice in health care with the advent of several 
anonymous reporting databases.  There have also been several initiatives aimed at 
reducing the incidence of errors, which range from national programs to intrafacility 
guidelines.  Several pieces of health information technology (HIT) have made an impact 
on error incidence and data collection, although there is much room for improvement.  
Patient controlled analgesia (PCA) pumps for pain management have been in existence 
for decades, and “smart pump” software has improved their safety and ease of 
programming.  PCA use in children presents challenges to clinicians, and the 
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characteristics of providers who write PCA orders and those who program PCA pumps 
may play a role in the incidence of events related to PCA.  This study seeks to elucidate 
trends in errors as they related to these different PCA providers in a pediatric hospital in 
the northeastern U.S. and provide recommendations for how PCA practice can be 
improved in this facility. 
Methods 
Safety Event Reporting System (SERS) reports of PCA events (n = 117) during 
the period of 2004 – 2012 were analyzed retrospectively to determine several key 
variables for data analysis.  The main focus of this analysis was those variable trends 
related to providers, including: proportion of events caused by human error, proportion of 
events related to subcategories of human error, proportion of types of prescribers 
involved in PCA events, proportion of errors in medical and surgical patients, proportion 
of errors occurring on day and night shifts for the nursing staff, and proportion of events 
that were dosing mistakes.  Statistical analysis was performed for these results when 
possible to determine significance. 
Results 
 Human errors were implicated in 84.1% of events, whereas PCA pump 
mechanical errors and software errors were implicated in 7.1% and 7.9% of events, 
respectively.  Statistically significant differences were found in all variables tested, 
including the proportion of nursing errors (60.9%) versus prescriber errors (28.7%) (p < 
0.0002).  For types of prescribers, the proportion of PCA events occurring when a M.D. 
wrote the PCA order (56.41%) was statistically different than when a N.P. wrote the PCA 
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order (39.32%) (p = 0.0129).  More surgical patients (61.5%) were affected by PCA 
events than medical patients (36.8%) (p < 0.0002).  There were more events occurring on 
the nursing staff day shift (59.8%) than the night shift (36.8%) (p = 0.0004).  Finally, 
dosing mistakes (66.7%) were implicated in significantly more PCA events than any 
other error type (33.3%) (p < 0.0002). 
Conclusion 
Several recommendations for improving the safety of PCA in pediatric pain 
management are justified by the results of this data analysis.  First, further education and 
simulation for entering PCA orders into the CPOE system is needed for all prescribers.  
Secondly, further education and simulation in PCA pump programming and system set-
up is needed for all nursing staff members.  In regard to prescriber credentials, it is 
recommended that Pain Treatment Service (PTS) staff members train M.D. residents in 
writing PCA orders and entering them into the CPOE system.  Finally, it is recommended 
that the SERS management team publish standardized error report content and entry 
format in order to streamline data analysis for quality improvement (QI) purposes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Medical Errors – Definitions and Confusion 
People who require medical treatment have a reasonable expectation that 
appropriate care will be provided toward a positive health outcome.  However, adverse 
events (AEs) are a major threat to patient safety that must be constantly monitored.  More 
importantly, clinical staff must be regularly educated about proper clinical practice 
guidelines and operation of new health care technologies, as well as implementation of 
error prevention strategies. 
AEs can be the result of complications that cannot be prevented, such as some 
postoperative infections or intraoperative hemorrhage, or they can be the result of 
preventable medical errors (Van Den Bos et al., 2011).  The International Conference on 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for 
Human Use, which includes the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO), defines AEs as “any untoward medical occurrence 
that may present during treatment with a pharmaceutical product but which does not 
necessarily have a causal relationship with this treatment” (Nebeker, Barach, & Samore, 
2004). 
AEs associated with medications occur more frequently than others (ICH, 1994), 
and these events have additional descriptive terminology.  Adverse drug reactions 
(ADRs) from approved and marketed medications are defined jointly by FDA and WHO, 
and recognized by the Clinical Center Pharmacy Department of the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) as: “A response to a drug which is noxious and unintended and which 
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occurs at doses normally used in man for prophylaxis, diagnosis, or therapy of disease or 
for modification of physiological function” (ICH, 1994; Chamberlain, 2011).  This 
implies a causal association between the action of the drug and the event in a patient.  
Standardization of the term ADR aims at removing the term “side effect” from medical 
vernacular when describing negative events, since side effects could mean negative, 
positive or neutral reactions (ICH, 1994; Nebeker et al., 2004).   
Adverse drug events (ADEs) are negative events associated with the prescribing 
or use of medications.  FDA considers ADE and AE to be synonymous, in which there 
may not be a causal relationship between the drug and the event in question.  Adding to 
the confusion, patient safety literature tends to imply causality in defining ADE and AE 
(Nebeker et al., 2004; Lisby, Nielsen, Brock, & Mainz, 2010).  Nebeker and colleagues 
recommend adopting a simplified version of the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) definition 
for ADE: “an injury resulting from the use of a drug.”  Under this definition, ADEs 
encompass all ADRs, and are closely related to medication errors (Figure 1).  Medication 
errors have been defined by The National Coordinating Council for Medication Error 
Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) as: 
…any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional, 
patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice, health care 
products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order communication; 
product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; 
distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use (NCC MERP, 2012). 
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Figure 1 – Relationship between ADEs, ADRs, and medication errors.  All ADRs are 
ADEs, and a sizeable proportion of ADEs are due to medication errors.  Taken from 
Nebeker, Barach, & Samore, 2004. 
 
The wide variety of definitions for ADEs and inconsistencies in event 
classifications may also be contributing to the variance in error reporting and incidence of 
error types (Lewis et al., 2009; Tully et al., 2009; Lisby et al., 2010).  Alluded to above, 
NCC MERP has attempted to standardize terminology and classifications of errors by 
identifying key points in the medication use timeline, which include: prescribing, 
documenting, dispensing, administering, and monitoring (Aronson, 2009; Santell, Hicks, 
McMeekin & Cousins, 2003; Hicks & Becker, 2006).  Literature review by Lewis and 
colleagues found that prescribing errors affected 50% of hospital admissions, but that 
many studies analyzed varied in criteria used to assess severity (Lewis et al., 2009).  
Uniformity in ADE reporting will allow for streamlined data collection and analysis, 
more accurate estimation of error incidence and prevalence, and sharing of information 
between health systems (Lewis et al., 2009; Lisby et al., 2010).  In one study it was found 
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that 45 different general definitions were used to describe an ADE in literature published 
between 1984 and 2006, and over one hundred papers published in this time period did 
not provide a general definition of an ADE (Lisby et al., 2010). 
 
Medical Errors – Incidence and Cost 
Medical errors have the potential to cause additional patient harm and a 
significant cost burden.  Of paramount importance over the monetary impact to the health 
care system is the impact of AEs on each patient and their loved ones.  Errors can change 
the course of a patient’s treatment, prolong hospital stays, result in lasting debilitation, 
and cause mortality. 
A well-known article based on the results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I 
estimated the incidence of AEs to be 3,691 per 100,000 patients in New York hospitals in 
1984.  Alarmingly, 27.6% of AEs were due to negligence, resulting in significantly more 
severe patient harm than AEs that were not associated with negligence.  Of all AEs 
analyzed in this study, 70.5% resulted in patient disability for less than six months, 2.6% 
caused permanent patient disability, and 13.6% resulted in mortality (Brennan et al., 
1991).   
More recently, Rothschild and colleagues analyzed AE incidence among 391 
critical care patients in one hospital, reporting that 120 AEs had affected 79 of these 
patients (Rothschild et al., 2005).  Medication errors involving opioids have the potential 
to be more harmful than with other classes of medications, requiring heightened vigilance 
and attention to detail on the part of clinicians.  Dy and colleagues reported 644 harmful 
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errors involving opioids, 23% due to underdosing and 52% due to overdosing.  Morphine 
and hydromorphone were most often implicated in dosing errors, and oxycodone was 
most often involved in errors of administering the wrong analgesic (Dy, Shore, Hicks, & 
Morlock, 2007). 
In pediatrics, Proctor and colleagues found that medical errors affected 67.2% of 
patients on a pediatric general surgery service, and that 32.8% of patients experienced 
adverse outcomes due to medical errors (Proctor, Pastore, Gerstle, & Langer, 2003).  In 
regard to opioids, McDonnell found that 314 errors reached pediatric patients, 259 of 
which involved morphine.  Improper dosing was cited as the most frequent type of opioid 
error.  Forty-seven patients had symptoms related to opioids, 16 of which described pain 
as the symptom (McDonnell, 2011).  These safety implications alone are justification for 
the constant comprehensive analysis of medical errors, as well as continued education 
and adoption of technology aimed at reducing their incidence.   
Aside from the human cost, the monetary cost of medical errors in U.S. health 
care adds more debt to a system already plagued by uncontrollable spending.  In 2008, it 
was estimated that the annual direct cost of measureable AEs in the U.S. that resulted in 
harm to patients was $17.1 billion (Van Den Bos et al., 2011).  Table 1 shows the 
costliest of these errors included in the study.  Progress toward solving this issue includes 
monitoring and reporting errors for analysis and potential system change, creating 
provider checklists for quality assurance, utilization of computerized physician order 
entry (CPOE) systems, and additional caregiver education both before and after an event 
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has happened.  Both the human and monetary costs of medical errors are an unacceptable 
reality that is cause for improvement of U.S. health care delivery. 
 
Table 1 – Costliest medical errors in 2008.  Central line infections were the costliest 
single event, whereas postoperative infections and pressure ulcers were the most costly 
overall due to their high incidence.  Taken from Van Den Bos et al., 2011. 
 
 
Reporting Medical Errors 
Once an ADE has occurred, immediate medical management of the error – if 
necessary – must be performed.  Secondly, clinical staff must communicate the ADE 
occurrence and its effect on the treatment plan to the patient and their family.   Thirdly, 
the error must be reported.  Reporting ADEs in a systematic manner allows for accurate 
data analysis leading to identification of problem areas that become targets for quality 
improvement (QI) initiatives.  Ultimately, the goal of reporting errors is to improve the 
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safety and quality of health care delivered to patients through education and 
dissemination of information within the medical community.   
There are several avenues that allow a practitioner to report such events.  
MedWatch is a well-known national ADE reporting program operated by FDA that has 
been in operation for two decades.  The Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) 
Medication Errors Reporting Program (MERP) is a national error reporting program that 
was jointly developed by ISMP and the U.S. Pharmacopeia (USP) for free ADE reporting 
by individual practitioners (Santell et al., 2003).   
Additionally, the FDA operates two databases that promote the safety observation 
of approved therapeutic products on the medical market.  The FDA Adverse Event 
Reporting System (FAERS) compiles data from reported ADRs to be reviewed by 
analysts in both the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and the FDA 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).  Further evaluation and regulation 
of approved products based on the reported findings from FAERS are then issued to 
ensure their safety and efficacy for consumers (FDA, 2012).  Aside from FAERS, FDA 
reports of medical device errors are compiled in the Manufacturer and User Facility 
Device Experience (MAUDE) database.  Equivalent to the ADR reporting and evaluation 
process, MAUDE reports AEs due to medical devices to analysts in the Center for 
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) (FDA, 2012).  Of considerable interest is the 
fact that all of these databases operate on a voluntary reporting basis, potentially 
misrepresenting the quantity and severity of medical errors occurring in the U.S. health 
care system. 
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Private companies are constantly developing software, logistics, and management 
solutions to streamline the future functioning of the U.S. health care system.  Quantros, 
Inc. partnered with USP in 1998 to develop MEDMARX, a subscription-only internet-
accessible database that was designed to augment MedWatch and ISMP MERP.  
MEDMARX is the largest medical error database of more than 40,000 ADR reports and 
1.3 million medication error reports (Quantros, Inc., 2009).  It allows hospitals and other 
health systems to confidentially and anonymously report and track AEs using NCC 
MERP standardized taxonomy, creating quantifiable data that can be readily analyzed 
and shared with the medical community (Santell et al., 2003). 
Santell and colleagues analyzed ADE reports submitted to MEDMARX between 
1999 and 2001, finding that 154,816 errors from 403 different health care facilities were 
reported (Table 2).  These errors included 4.5% that caused patient harm and nineteen 
fatalities.  Over the three-year period of this study, the number of ADEs reported 
increased exponentially, highlighting more widespread usage of MEDMARX software in 
the medical community.  Table 2 shows the top ten causes of errors reported for each 
year during the study (Santell et al., 2003). 
Hicks and Becker examined intravenous (IV) ADEs occurring between 2000 and 
2004 reported to MEDMARX.  They found that the incidence of harm in IV-related 
ADEs remained higher than in overall errors throughout the duration of the study.  
Interestingly, the authors doubt the validity of their data that showed a decline in the 
percentage of harmful errors, given the exponential increase in facilities reporting events 
to MEDMARX throughout the study period.  This explanation is further backed by data 
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in Figure 1 showing a steady increase in total number of IV-related ADE report records 
during the four-year period (Hicks & Becker, 2006).   
 
Table 2 – Top ten causes of medical errors from 1999–2001 in MEDMARX.  Sample 
sizes of ADE reports increased dramatically over the 3-year study period.  Taken from 
Santell et al., 2003. 
 
Based on the trend seen in these two studies, it seems too early to capture the true 
incidence of ADEs using MEDMARX because of the steadily increasing participation by 
more health care organizations.  However, the organizational usage of nationwide 
confidential and anonymous standardized error reporting systems like MEDMARX have 
the potential to offer valuable information once their utilization becomes uniformly 
mainstream within the medical community. 
Aside from the logistics of reporting ADEs and their value in estimating incidence 
and prevalence in facilities and health care organizations, there are interpersonal factors 
that may influence if and how errors are reported.   Personnel may underreport or fail to 
report AEs due to the fear of consequence – both professionally and socially (Schmidt & 
Bottoni, 2003; Banning, 2006; Milch et al., 2006).  Milch and colleagues found in their 
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Figure 2 – IV ADE reports from 2000–2004 in MEDMARX.  A steady increase in the 
number of ADE reports was seen throughout the duration of this study, highlighting the 
increased utilization of MEDMARX by more health care organizations.  Taken from 
Hicks & Becker, 2006. 
 
sample of 26 hospitals that while 47% of errors were reported by registered nurses 
(R.N.s), only 1.4% were reported by physicians.  They discuss that this finding may be 
due to the fact that nurses receive training specific to reporting and systematic evaluation 
of AEs, while physicians do not receive any training of this nature (Milch et al., 2006).  
Physicians have advocated for additional training on their role in handling errors (Boyle, 
O’Connell, Platt, & Albert, 2006).  There may also be knowledge deficits about error 
reporting procedures.  Kaldjian and colleagues surveyed faculty and resident physicians, 
finding that only 62.3% of faculty and 49.5% of residents knew how to report errors.  
Also, they found evidence of underreporting based on the lack of severity of the outcome 
to the patient; near misses and AEs that did not result in any harm were often unreported 
(Kaldjian et al., 2008). 
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 Patients and their families deserve full disclosure of AE occurrences, regardless of 
their designated severity level.  The Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) requires licensed practitioners in hospitals to inform patients and 
families if outcomes vary from what was anticipated (JCAHO, 2004).  Near misses and 
errors that do not change a patient’s course of treatment do not have mandatory reporting 
standards (Boyle et al., 2006).  Despite the JCAHO rules, a large study found a 
significant gap between physicians’ attitudes and practice of disclosing errors that caused 
harm to patients (Kaldjian et al., 2007).  Additionally, it was found that even when 
physicians did disclose errors to patients, they often orchestrated their words carefully.  
Patients often seek an apology, but physicians avoid this for reasons of possible legal 
liability.  This same study found that physicians were troubled when errors occurred, but 
did not know where to seek emotional support (Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers, Fraser, & 
Levinson, 2003).  It is clear that errors affect both patients and practitioners.  Full 
disclosure of events is ethical and necessary, which can contribute to strengthening the 
provider-patient relationship and ultimately delivering the best medical care available 
(Boyle et al., 2006). 
 
Measures to Reduce the Incidence of Medical Errors 
The IOM Quality of Health Care in America Committee issued a report in 
September 1999 called “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System” to address 
the unacceptable frequency of medical errors in U.S. Health Care.  This report 
acknowledges the faulty systems, processes, and conditions that lead to errors, which is 
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more common than any individual’s action or omission.  A four-tiered strategy was 
recommended in the report, comprised of: 
 Establishing a national focus to create leadership, research, tools, and protocols to 
enhance the knowledge base about safety. 
 Identifying and learning from errors by developing a nationwide public 
mandatory reporting system and by encouraging health care organizations and 
practitioners to develop and participate in voluntary reporting systems. 
 Raising performance standards and expectations for improvements in safety 
through the actions of oversight organizations, professional groups, and group 
purchasers of health care. 
 Implementing safety systems in health care organizations to ensure safe practices 
at the delivery level (Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 1999). 
In response, government agencies (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
[AHRQ], National Academy for State Health Policy [NASHP]), medical professional 
groups (Council on Graduate Medical Education [COGME], National Advisory Council 
on Nurse Education and Practice [NACNEP], and others), and private sector ventures 
(Leapfrog Group) have mobilized to launch an unprecedented interdisciplinary 
collaborative effort to systematically improve every facet of health delivery in regard to 
error prevention and education (Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 1999). 
 Several other initiatives have been tested for their effect on error reduction.  
Landrigan and colleagues reported findings from a randomized trial assessing the 
incidence of errors committed by physician interns who worked a traditional weekly 
schedule versus an intervention schedule that reduced the number of hours worked in a 
week and removed extended work shifts (24 hours or more).  They found that interns 
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working a traditional schedule made nearly 36% more serious medical errors than the 
intervention group, including 1.2 times as many serious medication errors and 5.6 times 
as many serious diagnostic errors.  Based on their findings, it is clear that changes in 
physician training must be included in the overall medical reform to reduce errors above 
and beyond the scheduling reforms enacted in 2003 by the Accreditation Council for 
Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) (Landrigan et al., 2004).  A similar study 
examining RN shifts in Australia reported that sleeplessness and fatigue were significant 
predictors of error occurrence, indicating the need for scheduling reform in nursing as 
well (Dorrian et al., 2006). 
 Specifically related to ADEs, there have been initiatives to reduce medication 
errors in one or more steps of the aforementioned medication use timeline.  At the multi-
facility level, the Health Care Improvement Foundation (HCIF) implemented the 
Regional Medication Safety Program for Hospitals in the Delaware Valley in 2001, in 
partnership with the Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI) and ISMP.  This 
program focused on 16 medication safety goals as the basis for its error reduction 
strategy, all of which fall under the four domains of: institutional culture, infrastructure, 
clinical practice, and technology.  The goals emphasize continued education and 
pharmacist involvement, and could potentially serve as a model for a nationwide systems 
approach to error reduction.  The program has hosted several educational seminars for 
medical, risk management, pharmacy, and managed care staff; information sessions for 
hospital trustees, administration, and staff; and comprehensive training sessions for 
hospital safety personnel.  JCAHO rated this program in its top five collaborative 
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initiatives for patient safety, coinciding with many of their safety guidelines (McCarter, 
Centafont, Daly, Kokoricha, & Leander Po, 2003). 
 On a smaller scale, Cox and colleagues describe measures taken to lower ADE 
incidence in the Maine Medical Center through system improvement.   Recording of 
pediatric inpatient weights, hepatic, and renal function became standard protocol in order 
to reduce guesswork by the pharmacy when calculating dosages.  This resulted in a 
drastic reduction in pharmacy interventions due to missing weights. Unnecessary verbal 
orders that commonly result in transcription errors were eliminated by forming a QI 
taskforce representing 20 services in the hospital.  This QI team restricted the types of 
situations that would permit verbal orders, reduced the number of personnel allowed to 
enter verbal orders, and modified their electronic medical record (EMR) system to alert 
physicians to unsigned orders for inpatients.  This QI approach resulted in a reduction of 
unsigned verbal orders at patient discharge from 7% to nearly 1%.  CPOE order forms 
were modified for a more user-friendly experience, which boosted utilization rates among 
resident physicians from 55% to 86% – further reducing verbal orders.  Reporting of 
pharmacy interventions electronically during the prescription or transcription process of 
the medication use timeline became standard protocol, resulting in reports of potentially 
life-threatening errors as the majority.  This led to the development of several internal 
pharmacy QI initiatives.  Lastly, handwritten incident report forms signed by the person 
responsible for the incident were done away with in favor of an anonymous electronic 
reporting system, nearly doubling the number of AEs reported during the reporting period 
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(Cox et al., 2001).  This anecdote of comprehensive system change is a reproducible 
adaptation of the IOM strategy in a single facility. 
 Similarities in medication trade names and appearances have been known to cause 
confusion and contribute to ADEs.  This can be caused by factors such as clinical 
similarity and poorly handwritten prescriptions.  Some common examples of confused 
proprietary drug names include: Celebrex (celecoxib), Cerebyx (fosphenytoin), and 
Celexa (citalopram).  The FDA and pharmaceutical manufacturers have an opportunity to 
enact changes in labeling, packaging, and software that will prevent confusion among 
new medications that are marketed (Hoffman & Proulx, 2003).  For medications already 
on the market, the ISMP, FDA, JCAHO, and several other health care safety agencies 
have advocated for the use of “Tall Man” letters to help differentiate between similar 
drug names.  The ISMP released an alphabetized list of medications using Tall Man 
lettering.  Some of those that were FDA-approved are included in Table 3 (ISMP, 2011).   
Filik and colleagues studied the effect of Tall Man letters using both eye-tracking 
technology and timed response recognition.  In the eye movement study, Tall Man letters 
proved to be effective in reducing mistakes when selecting names from an array used to 
simulate shelves containing medications in a pharmacy (Filik, Purdy, Gale, & Gerrett, 
2004).  In the timed responses experiment, it was found that although Tall Man letters did 
not make drug names less confusable, they increased attention which led to less 
recognition mistakes (Filik, Purdy, Gale, & Gerrett, 2006).  Darker and colleagues 
experimented with three different types of Tall Man lettering as compared to Natural 
(first letter capitalized) and Uppercase format, and found that Tall Man proved to be  
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Table 3 – ISMP list of medications using Tall Man letters.  Commonly confused drug 
names pairs are given.  The capitalized portion of the name is meant to highlight the 
dissimilarity.  Taken from ISMP, 2011. 
 
 
more effective than Natural, but not more effective than Uppercase.  The authors explain 
that this is the result of the size of characters in Uppercase lettering and their legibility.  
This is contrary to popular belief that the contrast in appearance between uppercase and 
lowercase letters in Tall Man formats is what makes them effective (Darker, Gerret, Filik, 
Purdy, & Gale, 2011).  To date, there are no mandated rules on what to capitalize, which 
could potentially introduce a new factor that perpetuates drug name confusion (Darker et 
al., 2011).  However, FDA and ISMP are pushing for the use of their tall man lettering 
scheme to promote standardization in practice (Grissinger, 2012). 
 In Canada, better drug labeling standards have been developed by CSA 
International for pharmaceutical manufacturers (Figure 2).  The chief alteration to drug 
labels is the introduction of a critical information panel, which includes: the generic name 
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for the drug, concentration, and total amount per total volume.  This information is 
presented in black text on a white background, and the trade name must not be larger than 
the generic (Orser, 2000). 
All strategies that are employed to reduce medical errors, whether broad or 
narrow in scope, multifaceted or singular in nature, should be constantly assessed for 
effectiveness and innovated for application in a variety of health care settings.  
Information sharing is critical to the global reduction of medical error frequency and 
incidence, leading to better prevention efforts and safer delivery of medical care. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Comparison of two drug labels.  The label on the left is in compliance with 
the CSA International standards, while the label on the right is in compliance with Health 
Canada standards.  The contents of the critical information panel are clearly visible in 
new label format.  Taken from Orser, 2000. 
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Technology Impact on Medical Errors 
Application of new technologies has the potential to streamline health care 
delivery and management, as well as contribute to reducing the frequency and incidence 
of medical errors.  However, as with any new implementation, there are unforeseen errors 
created that require additional management whilst in the process of reducing existing 
errors (Bates, 2000; Bates et al., 2001; Tully et al., 2009).  Health Information 
Technology (HIT) is the blanket term used to describe various tools that are developed to 
transmit and manage health information for the benefit of consumers, providers, payers, 
insurers, and any other stakeholders in health care systems (Goldstein & Blumenthal, 
2008).  These products are not yet at the stage of seamless utilization and consumer 
satisfaction, but their persistent evolution holds promise for the future (Mandl & Kohane, 
2012).   
Several pieces of HIT exist today, with some more refined and widely used than 
others: electronic medical records (EMR), also known as electronic health records 
(EHR); computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems; and clinical decision 
support (CDS) systems.  Many EMR systems have CPOE and CDS functionality built-in.  
Also barcode patient identification systems to automate the data entry process have been 
implemented in most facilities, although they are not foolproof either (Bates, 2000; Bates 
et al., 2001; Kaushal & Bates, 2002; McCarter et al., 2003).  Nichols and colleagues 
described errors due to manual data entry when the barcode system malfunctions, 
incorrect medical record numbers (MRN) due to facility transfer, patients with multiple 
wristbands, and reuse of expired MRNs for new wristbands (Nichols et al., 2004).  While 
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this is not the full list of HIT advances that are currently in practice, these are the most 
highly acclaimed and criticized for their impact on health care delivery. 
EMR systems are the flagship of the HIT movement.  They possess various 
functionalities making them more beneficial than traditional paper records, including: 
electronic patient data collection and storage, immediate record accessibility for medical 
providers, electronic order entry (CPOE), and presentation of standard care options to aid 
in clinical decision-making (CDS) (Goldstein & Blumenthal, 2008).  The Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) has cited a total of eight electronic functionalities for EHRs (IOM, 
2003).  However, EMR systems are not panacea for AEs in health care.  People must still 
perform procedures correctly, make complex decisions affecting patient care based on 
experience, and effectively communicate with the health care team.  EMRs can increase 
organization and efficiency, link information, and automatically check for problems, 
freeing providers to make them more available for patients (Bates, 2000; Kumar & 
Aldrich, 2010). 
The EMR systems of today possess inherent limitations.  For one, there are no 
nationwide standards or structured data definitions put in place by regulatory bodies in 
the U.S., leading to widespread incompatibility between systems (Kumar & Aldrich, 
2010).  Health Information Exchange (HIE) is a vision of EMR systems that can only be 
accomplished through interconnectivity that allows clinicians in any setting and any 
location to access and share information about any patient under their care (Goldstein & 
Blumenthal, 2008).  This interoperability problem is perpetuated by the number of EMR 
manufacturers presently in competition with one another in pursuit of a product that 
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revolutionizes health care management.  Mandl and Kohane report the existence of more 
than 700 companies that produce around 1750 distinct certified EMR products.  No single 
system has proven to be the most beneficial over others because not enough time has 
elapsed to truly measure and compare efficacy and cost-effectiveness.  However, there 
are Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs for providers that include use of 
certain systems over others for participation in an effort to standardize data sharing 
between groups.  But, these sponsored systems are often considered to be not the most 
valuable, limiting the worth of EMR utilization among participating providers (Mandl & 
Kohane, 2012). 
CPOE systems are the most highly advocated HIT and have had the greatest 
impact in reducing the incidence of ADEs.  They have been proven effective in catching 
both potential ADEs and actual ADEs, although the effect was greater in potential ADEs 
(Bates et al., 1998).  They provide a complete and structured medication order including: 
dose, route, and frequency; and will not allow an order to be submitted without entering 
all three parameters.  Orders appear on-screen in clearly legible computerized text 
(Figure 3), avoiding handwritten script interpretations and potential mistakes.  Most 
importantly, orders are automatically checked for appropriate parameters based on the 
patient’s weight and organ function, as well as against the rest of the patient’s orders, lab 
values, allergies, and any other pertinent information in the EMR for contraindications 
(Bates, 2000). 
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Figure 4 – CPOE interface screen shot.  Clear, legible orders with critical patient 
information can be seen in this example of a CPOE system.  Taken from Magrabi, Li, 
Day, & Coiera, 2010. 
 
CPOE systems are not immune to problems.  Although they eliminate handwritten 
order interpretation errors, errant keystrokes present a new error potential (McCarter et 
al., 2003).  Koppel and colleagues conducted an extensive survey of staff in a large 
tertiary care hospital to gain information about CPOE system factors that could 
precipitate ADEs.  Their data identified two general areas of concern: information errors 
and human-machine interface flaws.  A few of the identified causes for ADEs in each 
area are explained: 
The first information error identified was assumed dose information, meaning 
house staff relied on the CPOE system to determine dosages rather than clinical 
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guidelines.  Medication discontinuation failures were also identified due to a lack of alert 
when orders are duplicated, since discontinuation orders occur through a different 
process.  Procedure-linked medication discontinuation faults occur when procedures are 
cancelled that have accompanying medications, since the medication must be 
discontinued manually instead of automatically with the procedure cancellation.  Allergy 
information delay occurs because feedback on allergies from a patient’s history is only 
received after an order has already been entered into CPOE.  Conflicting or duplicative 
medication orders occur because the CPOE system is not linked to other hospital systems 
(Koppel et al., 2005). 
The first human-machine interface flaw was wrong patient selection due to an 
alphabetized list of patient names, leading to similar names being selected and 
inappropriate ordering.  Wrong medication selection occurs because up to 20 screens 
must be viewed in some cases for a complete list of a patient’s medications, leading to 
uncertainty in the screen viewer.  Unclear log on/log off from previous CPOE users can 
lead to unintended orders for patients or patients not receiving intended orders.  Inflexible 
ordering screens do not allow for entry of nonstandard specifications, and off-formulary 
medications must be ordered on a separate screen that may not reach the pharmacy 
(Koppel et al., 2005). 
Studies have reported user frustration with CPOE, electing to bypass the order 
entry process in favor of archaic written and verbal orders.  Also, a lack of linkage 
between CPOE and pharmacy systems commonly results in duplicate entries of orders.  
Medication administration records (MAR) will then show discrepancies between CPOE 
23 
 
and pharmacy, leading to manual verification and unneeded increased workload for 
hospital staff (Bates et al., 2001). 
Clinical decision support (CDS) software has been built into many CPOE systems 
and broader EMR infrastructures, but also exists independently of these two HITs in 
some facilities (Bates, 2000; Kaushal & Bates, 2002).  The crucial feature of CDS 
systems is real-time alerting of clinicians with computer-generated messages when 
critical patient laboratory results are available, which eliminates significant delays in 
treatment that occur when clinicians are alerted via telephone (Bates et al., 2001).  
Advanced CDS also may incorporate patient-specific or pathogen-specific information 
while providing recommendations to clinicians (Kaushal & Bates, 2002). 
Pediatric patients can benefit the most from effective HIT that reduces medication 
errors and ADEs.  Although the general implementation approach is the same in 
pediatrics as it is in adult medical care, HIT manufacturers must design more flexible 
programs and practitioners must be wary of technological limitations.  CPOE systems 
with built-in advanced CDS must have the capability for constant updates of patients’ 
weight, since all pediatric dosing strategies are weight-based.  They must also have 
customized checks since normal laboratory values change throughout the normal 
progression of childhood (Kaushal, Barker, & Bates, 2001).  As with the implementation 
of any new technology, pediatric CPOE must be constantly evaluated for various effects 
on patients and practice.  Han and colleagues actually found that a commercially sold 
CPOE system that was implemented in a large tertiary children’s hospital resulted in 
higher mortality rates than before implementation (Han et al., 2005).  Pediatric CDS 
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should contain drug libraries with pediatric dose ranges and built-in alerts, and it should 
also be contextualized for pediatric health issues, like the neonatal period.  Also, EMR 
systems should have medication-reconciliation tools, as well as linkage of immunization 
records to vaccination order forms.   
Similar barriers exist in adoption of EMR systems in pediatrics as in adult health 
care, including lack of nationwide standards or data definitions, which must be based on 
original pediatric data rather than adult data extrapolations (Kim & Lehmann, 2008).  
Pediatric-specific HIT must be constantly refined and studied for clinical efficacy and 
effectiveness.  In the future, information technologies can be made available to children 
and families to empower them to make well-informed health care decisions (Weitzman, 
2001). 
 
PCA Pumps and PCA Errors 
Mechanical infusion medication delivery devices are advanced pieces of 
equipment that have been in-use for several decades.  For pain management, patient 
controlled analgesia (PCA) pumps were developed in the 1970s in response to research 
that showed intermittent IV doses of opioids (the most commonly used class of 
analgesics) provided better coverage of pain than intramuscular (IM) injections of opioids 
(Macintyre, 2005; Mann, Ouro-Bang’na,&  Eledjam, 2005; Tran, Ciarkowski, Wagner, & 
Stevenson, 2012).  These machines offer patients better control of their own pain 
management, allowing for self-administration of analgesics for immediate relief.  PCA 
avoids potential delays in pain management caused by conventional clinician-
25 
 
administered doses of analgesics.  Clinician-administered pain management requires time 
for clinicians to be aware of a patient’s pain, and additional time to administer 
medication, all while the patient unnecessarily experiences pain.  This mode of pain 
management is usually used postoperatively, after particularly painful procedures 
(Miaskowski, 2005; Momeni, Crucitti, & De Kock, 2006). 
PCA pumps offer two delivery modes for analgesics: continuous infusion for 
baseline pain relief and operator-controlled bolus doses for on-demand pain relief (Mann 
et al., 2005).  The operator control is a handheld button that must be depressed to activate 
the bolus delivery system.  “PCA by Proxy” is anyone other than the patient pressing the 
button to deliver a bolus dose to the patient, whether authorized or unauthorized (Noah, 
2003; Wuhrman et al., 2007; D’Arcy, 2008).  Authorized agent controlled analgesia 
(AACA) refers to prescribed activation of the bolus delivery function by another person 
for patients who cannot perform this function (Wuhrman et al., 2007).  AACA includes 
nurse controlled analgesia (NCA) and caregiver controlled analgesia (CCA).  CCA is 
usually one family member who is given the sole responsibility for controlling the on-
demand pain relief for their loved one (Pasero & McCaffery, 2005; Wuhrman et al., 
2007).  AACA protocols vary widely from hospital to hospital.  For instance, the Pain 
Treatment Service (PTS) in a world-renowned pediatric hospital in the northeastern 
United States instituted a policy that allows for PCA and NCA, but CCA is only allowed 
in rare circumstances with approval from a PTS attending physician (Solodiuk, 2010). 
Regardless of who activates the on-demand bolus dose, PCA pumps have several 
built-in safety features.  PCA hardware includes the drug reservoir and the on-demand 
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control (Figure 4), which are designed so that access to the reservoir or the programming 
features is impossible without an administrative key or code (Mann et al., 2005).  PCA 
pumps are equipped with several programming features that allow for safe use.  First, a 
loading dose is delivered to the patient in order to achieve an effective analgesic 
therapeutic window.  A background infusion rate is set to maintain the patient’s pain 
relief within the therapeutic window.  A bolus dose is set to be delivered to the patient for 
on-demand pain relief when activated.  To avoid patient-induced overdose, a lockout 
interval is set so that a specified period of time must elapse before another bolus dose can 
safely be delivered to the patient, regardless of how many times the on-demand button is 
pressed.  Also, 1-hour and 4-hour limits can be set for maximum amount of medication 
delivered, and the pump will alert providers once the limit is reached (Macintyre, 2005; 
Mann et al., 2005; Momeni et al., 2006; Cranwell-Bruce, 2009). 
“Smart pump” software is another safety feature of newer PCA pumps.  This 
technology helps prevent programming errors by using a barcode scanning system that 
automatically enters the concentration information directly from the barcode on the 
medication cartridge before it is loaded into the pump.  Also, many smart pumps have the 
capacity to store drug libraries that aid in programming dosing information by offering 
upper and lower dosage limits derived from individual patient information (Harding, 
2012; Tran et al., 2012).  These limits can be “soft” or “hard” depending on the PCA 
model.  Soft limits alert the programmer when limits have been breached, but they allow 
for an override in order to maintain the setting that prompted the alert.  Hard limits, on 
the other hand, do not have an override option and the settings must be reprogrammed 
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Figure 5 – Abbott Lifecare PCA III®.  The on-demand bolus dose button, medication 
cartridge, tubing, and programming interface are clearly seen.  Taken from Lifecare
®
 
PCA 3 System Operating Manual: 430-04565-003, Abbott Laboratories, North Chicago, 
IL. 
 
within the limits (Tran et al., 2012; Maddox, Williams, Oglesby, Butler, & Colclasure, 
2006; Maddox, Oglesby, Williams, Fields, & Danello, 2008).  These alerts catch many 
potential ADEs before they have a chance to reach patients.  An important QI-based 
feature of smart pumps is the memory log that stores information about each 
programming entry, error, alert, and override, as well as reprogramming information.  For 
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a final safety checkpoint, a display screen shows the programmer all of the pump settings 
at the end of the process that prompts their verification (Tran et al., 2012).  New-age 
smart PCA pumps provide a platform that contains fewer avenues for programmer error, 
making PCA therapy a much less risky experience for pain management patients. 
There are several external safety monitoring devices that are commonly used in 
conjunction with PCA therapy. Since the most dangerous ADE associated with opioid 
therapy is respiratory depression (RD), continuous respiratory monitoring is necessary to 
reduce the incidence of RD and its harmful effects if left untreated.  Respiratory rate 
(RR), oxygen saturation (SpO2), and end-tidal carbon dioxide (EtCO2) are commonly 
monitored to ensure that patients do not succumb to RD (Maddox et al., 2006; Maddox et 
al., 2008).  Many facilities use pulse oximetry to measure SpO2, which is a commonly 
unreliable measurement since many patients receive supplemental oxygen that can mask 
desaturation even at low RR until it reaches a dangerous level and patients become 
apneic.  The most reliable monitoring for opioid ADE uses capnography, which 
simultaneously measures EtCO2, RR, quality of respirations, and apneic episodes 
(Maddox et al., 2006; D’Arcy, 2007; D’Arcy, 2008).  Many facilities have pain 
management policies that require respiratory monitoring during PCA therapy for high-
risk patients who have: 
 compromised airway. 
 significant kidney disease. 
 history of respiratory depression with opioid use. 
 large opioid dose for patient’s weight and/or condition. 
 significant lung disease in patients who are not ventilated. 
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 somnolence. 
 significant liver disease. 
 opioid [naivety] (use of opioids – scheduled or PRN for less than 72 hours) 
and concurrent use of other medication capable of central nervous system 
(CNS) depression (e.g. benzodiazepines). 
 morbid obesity. 
 muscle weakness. 
 patients less than 6 months of age with opioid infusions and on NCA. 
 opioid [naivety with continuous infusions] (Solodiuk, 2010). 
In pediatrics, this list indicates the majority of patients for respiratory monitoring during 
PCA therapy.  Several advanced smart PCA platforms also contain built-in pulse 
oximetry and noninvasive capnography, providing clinicians with trending data on 
oxygenation and ventilation in addition to smart pump features (Maddox et al., 2006). 
PCA pumps are versatile with various treatment plans, and they can deliver 
analgesics through different routes.  IV and epidural are the most commonly prescribed, 
but also oral, transdermal, subcutaneous (SC), sublingual (SL), intranasal (IN), and 
inhalation routes have been used in PCA therapy, although very rarely (Miaskowski, 
2005; Pasero & McCaffery, 2005; Palmer & Miller, 2010).  The most common 
medication used in PCA is morphine, but the pump can be loaded with different 
medications, including Dilaudid (hydromorphone), fentanyl, sufentanil, remifentanil, 
oxycodone, pethidine (meperidine), piritamide, and tramadol (Macintyre, 2005; Momeni 
et al., 2006; Palmer & Miller, 2010).  Adjuvant analgesics can also be loaded in addition 
to opioids to potentiate their analgesic properties while reducing adverse effects.  These 
include: ketamine (a NMDA antagonist), naloxone (an opioid competitive antagonist), 
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and clonidine (an α2-adrenoreceptor agonist) (Momeni et al., 2006).  Also, antiemetics 
have been added to PCA solutions in some cases to manage the potential adverse effects 
of opioids (Macintyre, 2005). 
Due to the various programmable parameters and versatility in medications and 
routes of administration, potential for errors are a concern especially in earlier-age, non-
smart pumps.  In smart pump PCA systems without barcoding, medication mix-ups and 
keystroke errors resulting in wrong drug concentration have been reported.  Independent 
of smart pumps, errors in prescriptions due to mistakes in oral to IV conversion ratios, 
and improper patient selection have been reported (Cohen & Smetzer, 2005; Hicks, 
Sikirica, Nelson, Schein, & Cousins, 2008; Etches, 1994; Baxter, 1994).   
Although much less common than human error in programming or prescription, 
software flaws have caused programming errors.  Reported flaws include: reversion to 
default concentration settings for medications when using a higher concentration 
(especially in Abbott Lifecare PCA II
®
 and APM Infusers
®
 models), verification screens 
that do not display all parameters for a final check, and required entry of dose in 
milliliters rather than milligrams (Cohen & Smetzer, 2005; Grissinger, 2008).  Human 
errors in setting up the PCA system have been reported, including: improper IV 
placement, blockage of tubing, and disconnection from medication reservoir (Hankin, 
Schein, Clark, & Panchal, 2007; Paul et al., 2010).  Even rarer are mechanical flaws due 
to cracked drug syringes or cassettes that can cause siphoning (free flow) of the 
medication into the PCA system (Cohen & Smetzer, 2005). 
 
31 
 
Pediatric Pain Management, PCA, and ADEs 
Pediatric patients are especially susceptible to medication errors and ADEs for a 
variety of reasons.  First off, they require weight-based dosing and dilutions of 
medications that were formulated for adults, leading to more calculations and conversions 
than adult patients; hence, more potential for errors.  Additionally, feedback about 
potential ADRs and improper administration is limited due to underdeveloped 
communication skills in children (Berde & Sethna, 2002; Kaushal et al., 2001).  Most 
importantly, compensatory mechanisms are less effective in children than in adults, 
making children more likely to experience harmful physiologic effects of overdose or 
omission.  A study of two academic pediatric hospitals found that potential ADE rates 
were three times as high in these institutions as in adult hospitals.  Also, this study found 
that drug ordering was most often implicated in potential ADEs, followed by incorrect 
dosing (Kaushal et al., 2001). 
Aside from blatant errors, appropriate practice of pediatric pain management also 
presents challenges to clinicians.  As children grow and develop, the pharmacokinetics 
and pharmacodynamics of medications change as the physiology of their target organs 
and metabolic machinery change.  For instance, hepatic clearance of medications is 
reduced in neonates as compared to adults, while it is increased in two- to six-year-old 
children.  In neonates, this is due to underdeveloped hepatic enzymes, including 
cytochrome P450, which is mostly implicated in drug metabolism.  In contrast, two- to 
six-year-old children have a more mature arsenal of hepatic enzymes, as well as a larger 
ratio of liver mass to body mass than adults, leading to a higher rate of clearance per unit 
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of medication than adults (Berde & Sethna, 2002).  Renal function matures during the 
first 12 months of life, making preterm newborns especially susceptible to renal toxicity 
from medication administration due to decreased renal clearance.  Other factors 
complicating normalized medication dosing in pediatrics include: proportion of body 
water to body weight, genetic variability affecting enzymatic function, and plasma 
protein concentration and binding kinetics, among others (Berde & Sethna, 2002). 
 PCA was once the most widely utilized modality for the management of pain in 
postoperative pediatric patients (Kost-Byerly, 2002; Verghese & Hannallah, 2010).  It is 
regarded as a safe and effective treatment for moderate to severe pain in children five 
years of age and older (Kost-Byerly, 2002; Joseph, 2007).  As in adults, pediatric PCA 
provides better analgesic relief not only due to the pharmacological effect, but immediate 
self-administration of medication decreasing the time from the onset of pain to the onset 
of analgesia, as well as constant titration of medication to meet the demand of patients’ 
ever-changing pain levels.  The advent of smart pump technology with various 
programmable parameters, safety limits, and storage of drug libraries in new-age PCA 
devices enhances the safety of PCA use in children (Manrique-Rodriguez et al., 2012).  
Clinicians argue that “…IV-PCA should be available to any child who understands the 
concept of pushing a button to take away the pain” (Kost-Byerly, 2002).   
Although postoperative pain is the most common indication for pediatric PCA, it 
is widely used for more effective analgesia in pediatric oncology patients with chronic 
pain and pediatric sickle cell patients experiencing acute pain due to a vaso-occlusive 
crisis (Pounder, 1992; McDonald & Cooper, 2001).  Children who are younger than five 
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or who do not have the physical or cognitive capability to operate PCA on-demand 
usually receive exclusively a continuous IV opioid infusion, NCA, or CCA (Berde & 
Sethna, 2002; Kost-Byerly, 2002).  Although continuous infusion provides better 
analgesic coverage, patients generally exhibit a higher level of sedation (Kost-Byerly, 
2002). 
Morphine is the most common opioid analgesic prescribed for pediatric PCA, and 
it is dosed according to the patient’s body weight (McDonald & Cooper, 2001; Verghese 
& Hannallah, 2010).  However, the pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic profile of 
each medication determines its suitability for an individual patient.  Hydromorphone or 
fentanyl may be used over morphine due to adverse effects (nausea, vomiting, etc.) that 
prevent its continued administration (McDonald & Cooper, 2001).  Less widely-used 
opioids may be used because of compromised clearance due to malfunctioning organ 
systems.  For instance, morphine PCA is contraindicated in renal failure due to retention 
of a renal-excreted metabolite that retains opioid activity, greatly increasing the duration 
of sedation (Vetter, 1992).  Fentanyl is generally used in renal failure because of its 
metabolism in the liver to inactive metabolites (Tobias & Baker, 1992).  The synthetic 
opioid, piritamide, has demonstrated efficacy in pediatric PCA with a lower incidence of 
nausea and vomiting than morphine, making it another suitable alternative for analgesia 
in children (Petrat, Klein, & Meissner, 1997).  Tramadol PCA has been observed in 
adults and as a continuous IV infusion in pediatrics, but not in pediatric PCA.  It also has 
a lower incidence of opioid adverse effects due to its inhibitory effect in the CNS, but it 
requires further study for application in pediatric PCA (Shipton, 2000). 
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PCA parameters in children, like adults, are typically set for the minimum amount 
of medication to achieve a balance of appropriate analgesia and a low incidence of 
adverse effects (McDonald & Cooper, 2001).  However, many facilities have 
predetermined guidelines for setting baseline PCA parameters.  The PTS in the 
aforementioned pediatric hospital in the northeastern United States starts morphine PCA 
patients with a 0.02 mg/kg on-demand bolus, 7-minute lockout interval, 4-hour limit of 
0.3 mg/kg, and a background infusion rate of 0.01 to 0.015 mg/kg/hour (Berde & Sethna, 
2002).  Background infusions are more often used in children than in adults, since studies 
have reported better sleep quality and duration with lower utilization of on-demand 
boluses throughout the night (McDonald & Cooper, 2001). 
The safety of pediatric PCA has been assessed in several studies.  Voepel-Lewis 
and colleagues compared the prevalence and risk of ADEs between pediatric PCA and 
NCA/CCA in a renowned pediatric hospital.  They found that although there was no 
difference between the groups, approximately 25% of postoperative PCA (including 
NCA and CCA) patients experienced a clinically significant ADE that required 
intervention.  PCA patients experienced more “threshold events,” requiring a dosing 
change or supplemental oxygen administration, while NCA/CCA patients experienced 
more “rescue events,” requiring naloxone reversal, airway management, or transfer to 
PICU (Voepel-Lewis, Marinkovic, Kostrzewa, Tait, & Malviya, 2008).   
Anghelescu and colleagues analyzed the safety of PCA, NCA, and CCA in their 
population of pediatric oncology patients during two different time periods.  Although 
previous studies have reported a higher incidence of errors during CCA than during PCA 
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(Monitto et al., 2000; Voepel-Lewis et al., 2008), the opposite was found in their 
population.  The authors attribute this to the nature of their oncology patients and their 
families, who are exceedingly vigilant and highly involved in their child’s care 
(Anghelescu, Burgoyne, Oakes, & Wallace, 2005; Anghelescu et al., 2012).  This finding 
highlights the importance of selecting appropriate candidates to administer CCA, and 
ensuring adequate education and comprehension of their role as a caregiver. 
Pediatric PCA, NCA, and CCA must endure constant surveillance and 
standardized ADE reporting in order to improve the safety of this analgesic modality in 
such a vulnerable patient population.  Many pediatric patients indicated for PCA therapy 
suffer from chronic conditions, such as sickle cell anemia and cancer, demanding 
heightened clinical vigilance since a significantly higher rate of iatrogenic ADEs were 
found to occur in these patients versus pediatric patients without chronic conditions 
(Ahuja, Zhao, & Xiang, 2012).  It was also found that potential ADE rates were 
significantly higher in neonates in the NICU, which mostly involved the drug ordering 
stage in the medication use timeline (Kaushal et al., 2001).  Of the aforementioned 
technologies that were developed to improve the delivery of medical care, CPOE and 
CDS systems were identified as having the greatest potential in the reduction of errors in 
pediatric inpatients.  Combined with refined communication between clinicians and 
pharmacists, standardized documentation, and constant pain assessment, the future of 
pediatric pain management promises an institutional culture of safety (Fortescue et al., 
2003).   
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Pediatric PCA Provider Characteristics at the Study Site 
Several different types of providers have an influence on the safety and delivery 
of PCA therapy in pain management.  Since the ratio of certain types providers to others 
involved in PCA therapy tends to vary from hospital to hospital, provider characteristics 
for the pediatric hospital that is the present study site are described below. 
First, two types of physicians generally prescribe PCA in this facility: pediatric 
anesthesiology fellows and medicine-pediatrics residents.  Fellows have more education 
and experience than residents (given that physicians must first complete a residency 
before pursuing a fellowship), and they also have a narrower field of clinical practice 
than residents.  Specifically at the study facility, pediatric anesthesiology fellows have 
one-year program that is ACGME accredited.  There is also a two-year program option in 
which fellows have the opportunity for more individualized training and experience 
during the second year.  The typical rotations for the first year include: 7 months of 
perioperative anesthesia, 2 months of cardiac anesthesia, 3 weeks of MSICU, and 1 
month of pain medicine and regional anesthesia (BCH, 2013).  Medicine-pediatrics 
residents, on the other hand, only perform brief rotations in the study facility as part of a 
partnership between the study facility and the parent hospital for their residency program.  
The time spent in the study facility practicing PCA orders varies between four weeks 
during Post Graduate Year (PGY)-1 and PGY-3 and 8 weeks during PGY-4 (BWH, 
2013).  In lay terms, PGY-1 and PGY-3 refer to one year and three years since 
completion of medical school, respectively. 
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Other than physicians, N.P.s and Physician Assistants (P.A.s) are also PCA 
prescribers at the study facility, although vastly more N.P.s prescribe PCA than do P.A.s.  
N.P.s and P.A.s that prescribe PCA in the study hospital only practice within PTS.  
Becoming a N.P. requires a master’s or doctoral degree, which includes advanced clinical 
training beyond the requirements of R.N. training (AANP, 2013).  Typical P.A. training 
spans 27 months, in which P.A.s are licensed to prescribe medication under the 
supervision of a physician.  Additionally, P.A.s must complete 100 hours of continuing 
medication education (CME) every two years to maintain licensure (AAPA, 2013). 
Staff R.N.s who program PCA pumps have varying educational pathways.  A 
Diploma in Nursing is conferred by a hospital-based educational program, an Associate 
Degree in Nursing (ADN) is a two-year program through community colleges and 
hospital-based programs, and a Bachelor of Science in Nursing (BSN) is a four-year 
degree conferred by colleges and universities.  To obtain licensure to practice as a R.N., 
all nursing program graduates must pass the National Council Licensure Examination 
(NCLEX)-RN (ANA, 2013).  Since there is no undergraduate program specifically for 
pediatric nursing, additional education and training in pediatrics are generally obtained 
through the employing organization (SPN, 2013).  At the study hospital, potential R.N. 
hires undergo a comprehensive orientation program that includes one full day of hospital 
orientation, one full day of classroom nursing orientation, online competency courses, 
and clinical skills simulation training (BCH, 2013). 
The ratio of certain providers to others in the study hospital generally follows the 
type of clinical service provided to the patient: surgical or medical.  For surgical patients, 
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all PCA orders are written by PTS N.P.s and pediatric anesthesiology fellows.  In 
contrast, for medical patients, the majority of PCA orders are written by medicine-
pediatrics residents, with PTS providing the pain management consultation before PCA 
orders are written.  It is important to note that 90% of PTS shifts are covered by N.P.s. 
A significant gap found during the literature review is a lack of investigation into 
the characteristics of providers that may influence the incidence rate and proportion of 
PCA errors in pediatric pain management.  This study seeks to help fill in this gap in the 
literature by relating data trends with PCA provider characteristics in the study hospital. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
Aside from the obvious negative impact that medical errors can have, learning 
from these events will have a positive impact on the quality of patient care delivered in 
any facility.  This can only occur through extensive review of documented instances, 
providing data for strategic and comprehensive approaches to reducing ADE incidence 
and recurrence.  Many of these preventable errors are due to the human factors, 
emphasizing the importance of intra- and interdepartmental communication between 
clinical and pharmacy teams.  Combined with appropriate training for using error-
reducing HIT, the rate of clinician-caused errors should continue to be reduced. 
The same applies to PCA use in pediatric pain management.  Therefore, the 
objective of the present study is to identify provider issues in the setting of pediatric PCA 
errors in a 400-bed pediatric hospital in the northeastern United States through data 
analysis.  During the period of this study, Abbott Lifecare PCA III
®
 devices were the 
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only model used at this facility.  This retrospective review includes data analysis from 
PCA event descriptions voluntarily reported to the Safety Event Reporting System 
(SERS) and data abstracted from EMR charts for each patient affected by a PCA event.  
The data will be quantified to produce descriptive statistics in order to display potential 
trends in these errors.  The trends will be used to suggest changes in pain management 
practice to improve PCA patient safety and quality of care delivered. 
More specifically, several data points for which there is relatively little literature 
support will be analyzed for their influence on PCA events and correlation with provider 
characteristics: 
 Hospital unit where the event occurred 
 Year that the event occurred, within the study period of 2004 – 2012 
  “Final Severity Assessment” level that the event was classified, as 
determined by the SERS management team 
 Source of the event (e.g., human, software, mechanical) based on the event 
description entered into SERS by the nursing staff on-shift 
 Subtypes of human errors (e.g., nurse, prescriber, pharmacy) based on the 
event description entered into SERS by the nursing staff on-shift 
 Credentials of the clinician that wrote the PCA order (e.g., M.D., N.P., P.A., 
Pharmacy) based on analysis of PCA pump histories entered in the 
Medication Administration Record (MAR) 
 Type of patient affected by the event (medical or surgical) 
 Nursing staff shift (day or night) 
 Type of event (e.g. dosing mistake) 
 Difference in actual dose minus intended dose for all dosing errors 
The relationship between medical error incidence, documented strategies and 
technologies developed to reduce error incidence, and PCA safety in pediatrics is the 
driving force for the present study.  Introducing the human factor on the part of providers 
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as it relates these factors will contribute to QI in the context of PCA therapy in this 
pediatric hospital. 
 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
 The Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed the study protocol and granted 
permission to access patient charts in the EMR system for a retrospective review and data 
abstraction via patient MRNs entered into SERS.  Two reviewers (T.S., B.Q.) obtained 
and examined all reports in the “PCA Events” category of SERS (n = 117) from February 
10, 2004 to December 8, 2012.  As part of a larger comprehensive review of PCA errors 
reported to SERS, each event description was reviewed to classify and determine the 
interplay of several identifiable variables.  Variables that could not be ascertained from 
the SERS report were abstracted from patient charts in the EMR system.  Any 
discrepancies between the two reviewers were resolved through consensus or group 
discussion with a third reviewer (J.S.), who is an experienced PTS pediatric nurse 
practitioner (N.P.) and researcher at the hospital.  The third reviewer also reviewed and 
supervised the IRB application process, as well as the data collection procedures.  All 
variable classifications were ultimately appraised by the third reviewer for final 
acceptance or revision before data compilation and statistical analyses. 
For the purposes of the present study, only variables pertinent to clinicians were 
included in order to analyze their impact on the overall PCA error incidence rate and 
contributing covariates.  First, the number of errors overall as a function of time and as a 
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function of hospital unit were included to elucidate general PCA error trends.  Next, the 
number of events by each Final Severity Assessment level (Table 4), as determined by 
nursing staff members who submitted the report to SERS was totaled for comparison.   
More specifically to providers, the number and percentage of human errors versus 
non-human errors, as well as subcategories of human error were explored to elucidate 
data trends.  Also, the number and percentage of errors as a function of the credentials of 
the prescriber (e.g., M.D., N.P., P.A., Pharmacy) who wrote the PCA order that led to the 
error were investigated.  Errors affecting medical versus surgical patients were totaled for 
comparison in order to determine data trends related to the types of providers that write 
PCA orders on the medical and surgical services.  In relation to R.N.s who program PCA 
pumps based on prescriber orders in the CPOE, error trends on the day shift versus the 
night shift were totaled for comparison. 
Finally, in relation to proportion of dosing mistakes, analgesic dosing errors 
versus non-dosing errors as designated by the chart reviewers were totaled for 
comparison.  Also, the percentage difference in the actual dose of analgesic versus the 
prescribed dose, as well as the average deviation of the actual dose from the prescribed 
dose for dosing errors was analyzed. 
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Table 4 – Final severity assessment levels.  Severity levels ranging from “near miss” to 
“moderate” impact on patients were documented in SERS during the study period. 
Final Severity Assessment level Impact on patient 
0 Near Miss/Potential Harm 
1 None 
2 Minor 
3 Moderate 
 
 
Statistics 
 Several variables were analyzed further with a z ratio calculation for the 
significance of the difference between two independent proportions, using VassarStats 
(Poughkeepsie, NY) software.  These two-tailed analyses were tested with alpha (α) level 
of 0.05.   
First, the incidence rate of errors in 2005 was compared to 2012 to assess the 
significance of the difference from the beginning to the end of the study period.  Also, the 
incidence rate of errors in 2006 was compared to 2008 to assess the significance of the 
difference in this two-year span.  The proportions of errors committed by the floor 
nursing staff versus prescribers were tested for significance of difference.  Also, the 
proportion of errors with a M.D. as the prescribing clinician was compared for 
significance of difference against the proportion of errors where a N.P. was the 
prescriber.  The proportion of errors affecting surgical patients was compared to the 
proportion of errors affecting medical patients, as well as the proportion of errors 
committed during the day shift were compared to that of the night shift.  Finally, the 
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proportion of PCA dosing errors was compared to the proportion of all other error types 
for significance of difference. 
 
RESULTS 
First, the number of PCA events was analyzed by hospital unit (Table 5), in order 
to ascertain the distribution of errors by clinical service.  The highest proportion of errors 
(27.4%) occurred in a unit serving orthopedic and general surgery patients.  Second 
highest proportion (15.4%) of error was a medical surgical intensive care unit (MSICU), 
and third (12.8%) was a unit that serves patients undergoing bone marrow transplants.  A 
limitation of this data was that the total number of patients served in each hospital unit 
during the study period was unknown. 
Next, PCA error incidence per 10,000 PCAs was analyzed by year during the 
study period (2004 – 2012) (Table 6).  The two highest rates were observed in 2008 
(111.59) and 2009 (111.31).  To evaluate the trend in errors from the beginning to the end 
of the study period, PCA error incidences in 2005 (26.20) and 2012 (92.14) were 
compared, finding a significant difference (p = 0.0053) between them.  To evaluate the 
largest difference in errors during a two-year span within the study period, error 
incidences in 2006 (28.83) and 2008 (111.59) were compared, again finding a significant 
difference (p = 0.001) between them.  Figure 6 shows the yearly trend in PCA error 
incidence. 
 Table 7 and Figure 7 display the number and percentage of errors that were 
reported at each “Final Severity Assessment” level as designated by the nursing staff 
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reporting the error to SERS.  The majority of PCA errors reported (62.4%) were Severity 
Level 1, meaning there was no measurable impact on the affected patient. 
 The source of each PCA event is displayed in Table 8, showing that the vast 
majority of errors were caused by a human mistake (84.1%).  Figure 8 displays this data 
graphically.  Table 9 breaks down human errors into subtypes, revealing that significantly 
more nursing errors (60.9%) occur than prescriber errors (28.7%) (p < 0.0002).  Figure 9 
displays the proportion of human error subtypes in a pie chart.  Table 10 shows the 
number and frequency of errors by the credentials of the prescriber.  By far, M.D. and 
N.P. licensed prescribers authorized the most PCA orders (56.41% and 39.32%, 
respectively).  When compared against one another, a significant difference was found (p 
= 0.0129).  Figure 10 is a graphical representation of this comparison. 
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Table 5 – PCA errors by hospital unit.  This table shows the number and frequency of 
PCA errors by the hospital unit where the error occurred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hospital unit Number of Errors (n) Percent 
Research and Hematology 4 3.4% 
Oncology and Hematology 7 6.0% 
Bone Marrow Transplant 15 12.8% 
MSICU 18 15.4% 
Medicine 10 8.5% 
Cardiovascular 1 0.9% 
CICU 1 0.9% 
Neurosurgery 4 3.4% 
General Surgery 1 0.9% 
Orthopedics and General Surgery 32 27.4% 
Transplant, Urology, and Surgery 5 4.3% 
ICP 2 1.7% 
MICU 1 0.9% 
Surgery and Urology (satellite facility) 1 0.9% 
PACU 6 5.1% 
Emergency Department 9 7.7% 
TOTAL 117 100.0% 
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Table 6 – PCA errors by year.  This table shows the number and incidence of PCA 
errors by year during the study period. 
Year Total PCAs Number of Errors (n) Incidence rate per 10,000 PCAs 
2004 2412 1 4.15 
2005 2290 6 26.20 
2006 2428 7 28.83 
2007 2124 19 89.45 
2008 1613 18 111.59 
2009 1617 18 111.31 
2010 1582 17 107.46 
2011 1621 16 98.70 
2012 1628 15 92.14 
TOTAL 17,315 117 67.57 
2005 v. 2012 p = 0.0053   
2006 v. 2008 p = 0.0010   
 
 
Figure 6 – PCA errors by year.  A drastic increase in error incidence between 2006 and 
2008 was observed.  Significant differences (p = 0.0053; p = 0.001) in incidence rates 
were found between 2005 and 2012; 2006 and 2008, respectively. 
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Table 7 – Final Severity Assessment totals.  This table shows the number of events at 
each severity level, as designated by the nursing staff. 
 Final Severity Assessment level Number of Errors (n) Percent 
0 – Near Miss 10 8.5% 
1 – None 73 62.4% 
2 – Minor 32 27.4% 
3 – Moderate 2 1.7% 
TOTAL 117 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Final Severity Assessment totals.  The majority of errors occurred with no 
impact on the patient. 
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Table 8 – Sources of PCA errors.  This table shows the number and percentage of each 
category of error. 
Error Category Number of Errors (n) Percent 
Human 106 84.1% 
Mechanical 9 7.1% 
Patient 1 0.8% 
Software 10 7.9% 
TOTAL 126* 100.0% 
*Events that were determined to fit two or more error categories (ie. Human AND 
Mechanical) were counted once in each category.  Hence, the sum of cases (n = 126) 
exceeds the number of events (n = 117). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Sources of PCA errors.  This graph shows the number of errors (n) for each 
error category. 
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Table 9 – Sources of PCA human errors.  This table shows the number and percentage 
of each subcategory of human error. 
Human Error Subcategory Number of Errors (n) Percent 
Nurse 70 60.9% 
Prescriber 33 28.7% 
Pharmacy 9 7.8% 
Other 3 2.6% 
TOTAL 115* 100.0% 
Nurse v. Prescriber p < 0.0002  
*Events that were determined to fit two or more error categories (ie. Nurse AND 
Prescriber) were counted once in each category. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Sources of PCA human errors.  A significant difference (p < 0.0002) in 
proportion of errors committed by nurses and prescribers was observed. 
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Table 10 – PCA errors by prescriber credentials.  This table shows the number and 
percent of PCA errors by the credentials of the prescriber that wrote the PCA order. 
Prescriber Credentials Number of Errors (n) Percent 
M.D.* 66 56.41% 
N.P. 46 39.32% 
P.A. 1 0.85% 
Pharmacy 1 0.85% 
Not Applicable 2 1.71% 
Unknown 1 0.85% 
TOTAL 117 100.00% 
M.D. v. N.P. p = 0.0129  
*One event where the prescriber was a D.O. was included in the M.D. total errors (n = 66). 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – PCA error percentage by M.D. versus N.P.  A significant difference 
(p = 0.0129) in the proportion of errors between the two types of prescribers was 
observed. 
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Error number and proportion in surgical patients (61.5%) and medical patients 
(36.8%) receiving PCA therapy is shown in Table 11, and displayed graphically in Figure 
11.  The difference in proportion of errors affecting the two types of patients was found 
to be significant (p < 0.0002). 
Table 12 breaks down the number and percentage of PCA errors that occurred by 
nursing shift, revealing that significantly more (p = 0.0004) errors occurred during the 
day shift (59.8%) than during the night shift (36.8%).  Figure 12 shows a pie chart 
representation of this discrepancy between the two nursing staff shifts. 
The proportion of PCA dosing errors (66.7%) was compared to the proportion of 
all other error types combined (33.3%) in Table 13, which was found to be significantly 
different (p < 0.0002).  This data is represented in a pie chart in Figure 13.  Finally, Table 
14 contains distribution data from the calculated difference of the actual dose minus the 
intended dose in milligrams [mg].  These data show the average dosing error is 16.7 mg 
more than the intended dose, and the maximum dosing error reported to SERS was 527.5 
mg more than the intended dose.  
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Table 11 – PCA errors in medical and surgical patients.  This table shows the number 
and percentage of errors affecting each type of patient.  A significant difference  
(p < 0.0002) in errors was observed between the two patient types. 
Patient Type Errors (n) Percent 
Surgical  72 61.5% 
Medical 43 36.8% 
Not Applicable 2 1.7% 
TOTAL 117 100.0% 
Surgical v. Medical p < 0.0002  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 – PCA errors in medical and surgical patients.  A significant difference (p 
< 0.0002) in the proportion of errors affecting surgical and medical patients was 
observed. 
 
 
 
61% 
37% 
2% 
Surgical
Medical
Not Applicable
53 
 
Table 12 – PCA errors by nursing shift.  This table shows the number and percent of 
PCA errors by the nursing staff shift when the error occurred. 
Shift Number of Errors (n) Percent 
Day 70 59.8% 
Night 43 36.8% 
Unknown 3 2.6% 
Both 1 0.9% 
TOTAL 117 100.0% 
Day v. Night p = 0.0004  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 – PCA errors by nursing shift.  The majority of errors occurred during the 
day shift.  A significant difference (p = 0.0004) in proportion of errors was observed 
between day and night shifts. 
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Table 13 – PCA dosing errors.  The majority of errors occurred in the pump 
programming phase of the medication use timeline, resulting in dosing errors. 
Type Errors (n) Percent 
Dosing 78 66.7% 
Other 39 33.3% 
TOTAL 117 100.0% 
Dosing v. Other p < 0.0002  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 – PCA dosing errors.  This graph displays the percentage of PCA errors that 
were determined to be dosing errors.  A significant difference (p < 0.0002) in proportion 
of dosing errors and all other error types combined was observed. 
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Table 14 – Difference of actual dose minus intended dose.  All dosing calculations in 
milligrams [mg]. 
Difference of Actual Dose (morphine equivalent in mg*) minus Intended 
Dose (morphine equivalent in mg*) n = 78 
Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
75th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
 -25 527.5 16.7 1.2 5 0.1 
 *All PCA orders written for hydromorphone or fentanyl were converted into IV 
morphine equivalents for statistical calculations. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Results 
 This study analyzed PCA error incidence and percentages from a multitude of 
variables that may be related to human error by clinical providers.  The aim was to 
provide information about error patterns for internal QI purposes, as well as 
dissemination of information to the rest of the medical community at large. 
 First, more errors occurred in the Orthopedics and General Surgery Unit (27.4%) 
than any other unit.  This is an interesting finding given that patients receiving PCA 
therapy on the various medical services tend to be more complicated cases than surgical 
patients receiving PCA, with multiple medications and conditions affecting the efficacy 
of their pain management.  Likewise, this finding is inconsistent with results reported by 
Brennan et al., in the Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, which found that 
far more AEs occurred in the General Medicine unit.  However, PCA is mostly 
prescribed to surgical patients in the study facility, making up a larger portion of total 
PCAs. 
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 The number of PCA errors by year elucidated several interesting findings.  First, 
out of 2412 total PCAs in 2004, only one error event was reported to SERS.  Likewise, 
only six errors were reported in 2005 and seven reported in 2006.  This indicates that 
error reporting to SERS had not become a standard of practice until 2007, when 19 errors 
were reported. 
Statistically, the incidence rates of PCA events reported in 2005 and 2012 (the 
beginning and end of the study period) were found to be significantly different (p = 
0.0053).  This also could indicate that the process of programming PCA settings in 
conjunction with orders from CPOE systems and other relatively new HIT has not yet 
been streamlined or universally adopted in all units of the study facility.  The two-year 
span with the highest increase in incidence of reported PCA events, 2006 and 2008, was 
also found to have significantly different error incidence rates (p = 0.001).  Again, this 
can be attributed to lack of HIT system continuity between hospital units and PCA pump 
misprogramming due to incorrect parameters or errant CPOE orders. 
 The vast majority of errors were designated as human errors, with significantly 
more errors caused by the nursing staff than caused by prescribers (p < 0.0002).  The 
proportion of errors caused by both types of providers involved in delivering PCA 
therapy is unacceptable, indicating that further education and simulation exercises are 
needed.  This is true for both entering PCA orders in the CPOE system on the part of 
prescribers and programming orders into the PCA pump interface on the part of the 
nursing staff.  In addition to pump misprogramming, other errors caused by the nursing 
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staff included incorrect set-up: incorrect medication cartridge, tubing, and/or IV 
placement. 
In relation to PCA prescribers, the proportion of errors reported when the 
prescribing clinician was a M.D. was significantly different (p = 0.0129) than the 
proportion of errors reported when the prescribing clinician was a N.P.  This is a 
surprising finding given that N.P.s on PTS write more PCA orders than do M.D. 
residents.  Interestingly, in this facility M.D. medicine-pediatrics residents receive 
relatively little training on PCA orders as compared to their N.P. counterparts.  This is 
due to the aforementioned timeline of medicine-pediatrics residents, who only spend a 
relatively short time in their training at the study hospital, and much less of that devoted 
to solely prescribing PCA.  In contrast, N.P.s and some of the fellows with PTS are career 
pediatric pain management practitioners, with a larger proportion of their clinical practice 
devoted to prescribing PCA.  This is an important distinction that could play a role in the 
difference in error proportions between these two disciplines of practice.  Also, this 
discrepancy may be due to miscommunication between physicians entering PCA orders 
in the CPOE system and the nursing staff who use these orders to program the PCA pump 
parameters.  The staffing ratio of M.D.s to N.P.s was not obtained for this variable 
analysis, which is a limitation of its validity. 
 Surgical patients undergoing PCA therapy were affected by a significantly higher 
proportion of errors than were medical patients (p < 0.0002).  Again, this finding is 
inconsistent with Brennan et al., and perplexing because surgical patients tend to be 
simpler PCA candidates than medical patients.  Also, this is surprising given that PCA 
58 
 
orders for all surgical patients in the study facility are written by N.P.s.  Also, this may be 
due to the transfer of care for postsurgical patients from PACU to an observation unit or 
ICU which may or may not have been utilizing the EMR system to verify and continue 
PCA orders. 
PCA error frequency between the day (59.8%) and night (36.8%) work shifts for 
the nursing staff were compared and found to be significantly different (p = 0.0004).  
This may be due to fact that most surgeries at this pediatric hospital are performed during 
the day shift, requiring a transfer of care from the PACU to an observation unit or ICU.  
It may also be due to inadequate staffing levels during the day shift, forcing nurses to 
multitask and reduce assessment time per patient. 
 Finally, there were significantly more dosing errors (66.7%) than all other types 
of errors combined (33.3%; p < 0.0002).  There are numerous causes for PCA dosing 
errors, ranging from errant keystrokes by prescribers in the CPOE system when ordering 
PCA, to misplacing a decimal point when programming pump parameters, to 
miscalculation of IV opioid dose by pediatric weight.  The majority of PCA dosing error 
reports in SERS were designated as Severity Level 1-None indicating no clinical findings 
or changes in the patient’s condition as a result of the errant dose.  A handful of reports 
indicate underdosing of patients causing inadequate pain management, which were 
designated as Severity Level 2-Minor.  Several reports of overdose resulted in RD and 
somnolence, in which the opioid medication was titrated down in PCA and the patient 
monitored until normal RR and consciousness were restored. There were only two cases 
of overdose that were designated Severity Level 3-Moderate.  The first resulted in RD 
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and hypotension as a result of the 4-hour lockout never being set on morphine PCA.  The 
patient received 3 mg more morphine during the 4-hour period than intended had the 
lockout been set correctly.  The error was managed by stopping PCA and administering 
normal saline IV bolus to flush the catheter line of the excess morphine.  The second 
Severity Level 3-Moderate overdose resulted in the patient becoming apneic with SpO2 
levels dipping into the mid- to low-80% range.  This error was managed by stopping the 
patient’s continuous morphine infusion and removing the on-demand PCA bolus trigger.  
It was determined that the patient was oversedated in PACU after receiving 20 mg of 
morphine IV in addition to initiation of morphine PCA before being transferred to the 
Orthopedics and General Surgery Unit.  There were no reports of overdoses requiring 
“rescue events” such as naloxone administration or advanced airway management at the 
bedside.   
 
Future Directions 
First, although significance cannot be determined due to a lack of data about the 
total number of PCAs on each hospital unit, heightened vigilance and attention to detail 
by clinical staff in the Orthopedics and General Surgery unit could have an impact on this 
proportion of the total number of PCA errors in relation to the other units in the hospital. 
Mentioned earlier, the proportion of errors caused by both prescribers and nurses 
involved in delivering PCA therapy is unacceptable, indicating that further education and 
simulation exercises are needed.  It is recommended that all PCA prescribers undergo 
yearly refresher courses focused on proper PCA order entry in the CPOE system.  Also, it 
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was discussed that in addition to pump misprogramming, PCA system set-up was also 
included in human errors caused by nurses.  Therefore, it is recommended that the 
nursing staff undergo further education on pump programming using the PCA interface 
and more comprehensive education regarding correct PCA system set-up and operation. 
Given the educational discrepancy between medicine-pediatrics residents rotating 
in the study facility and members of the PTS team, it is recommended that PTS conduct 
training sessions for residents.  These training sessions should be focused on proper PCA 
parameters and pain management practice tendencies based on the experiences of PTS 
practitioners. 
It is encouraging to note the institutional shift toward reporting to SERS any PCA 
event that could potentially cause an ADE as a standard of practice.  Increased provider 
education about the importance of compiling and analyzing data from errors for QI 
purposes, as well as a no-fault culture inherent in anonymous error reporting have 
contributed to this development.  Consistent with Cox et al., improved error reporting as 
a standard of practice will increase knowledge about error occurrences and pave the way 
for meaningful QI initiatives.  Due to the wide variance in the content of PCA event 
descriptions entered into SERS, it is recommended that the SERS management team 
publish an event entry protocol that features a standardized format and content to be 
mandated throughout the facility. 
Additionally, streamlining the transfer of care process between hospital units by 
mandating that every unit must consistently utilize newly-implemented HIT systems may 
reduce the confusion of multiple orders that must be transcribed from the computer 
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screen to paper and vice versa during this process.  In turn, this uniformity of information 
sharing between hospital units may reduce the chance for error when patients are 
transferred. 
Constant educational reinforcement of licensed prescribers and nursing staff about 
proper use of the EMR and CPOE systems will increase their usage and cut down on 
providers who elect to bypass the systems for their own convenience.  Additionally, 
multiple checkpoints between the prescriber, pharmacy, and pump programmer are 
essential to ensuring the safety of PCA medication orders and subsequent administration 
to patients. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, the aim of this study was to describe PCA/NCA errors using 
descriptive statistics to highlight implications for providers and potential areas for 
improvement.  It was found that the vast majority of PCA errors were caused by human 
factors, including incorrect PCA medication order entry into the CPOE system and PCA 
pump misprogramming, among others.  The implementation of HIT at this pediatric 
hospital has the potential to reduce the risk for errors and decrease cost.  Neither of these 
potentials has been realized thus far, and it is clear that adoption remains in the lag phase.  
As health care delivery technologies become more complex and capable of streamlining 
processes, manufacturers must be increasingly cognizant of their products’ user-
friendliness.  In the case of HIT systems and PCA pump interfaces, continued refinement 
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by manufacturers is necessary to approach the positive impact on health care promised by 
these products. 
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